專利審查與上訴委員會(huì)對(duì)裁決的充分解釋仍是判斷撤銷的關(guān)鍵

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發(fā)布：IPRdaily中文網(wǎng)（IPRdaily.cn）
作者：Jafon Fearson律師及James Naughton律師
供稿：Brinks Gilson & Lione律師事務(wù)所
原標(biāo)題：專利審查與上訴委員會(huì)對(duì)裁決的充分解釋仍是判斷撤銷的關(guān)鍵

在Vivint, Inc. v. Alarm.com, Inc.案件中，聯(lián)邦巡回法院撤銷了專利審查與上訴委員會(huì)（PTAB）對(duì)一項(xiàng)權(quán)利要求作出的解釋（a claim construction），該解釋提出了與涉案專利教導(dǎo)（teachings）相反的解釋，法院還就“當(dāng)委員會(huì)依賴專家證詞對(duì)權(quán)利要求作出解釋時(shí)，在何種情況下有權(quán)使（上訴法院）對(duì)委員會(huì)的裁決解釋進(jìn)行遵從（deference）”這一問題向從業(yè)人員提供了指導(dǎo)。法院對(duì)本案的意見與近期一系列強(qiáng)調(diào)PTAB有義務(wù)對(duì)其裁決提供充分解釋的案件裁決相符合。

拓展

專利教導(dǎo)（Patent teachings）

美國最高法院確立判斷一項(xiàng)發(fā)明是否具有非顯而易見性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，既（1）現(xiàn)有技術(shù)的范圍與內(nèi)容；（2）現(xiàn)有技術(shù)與請(qǐng)求保護(hù)權(quán)利要求的區(qū)別；(3) 相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的普通技術(shù)水平；（4）輔助判斷因素（secondary considerations）。在隨后的司法實(shí)踐中，美國聯(lián)邦巡回上訴法院對(duì)這四項(xiàng)判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作了進(jìn)一步的闡述，并確立了“教導(dǎo)-啟示-動(dòng)機(jī)” （teaching-suggestion-motivation）標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，即如果現(xiàn)有技術(shù)文獻(xiàn)的內(nèi)容給出了明確的教導(dǎo)和啟示，使該領(lǐng)域的普通技術(shù)人員有動(dòng)機(jī)將它們結(jié)合起來得到新技術(shù)，則權(quán)利要求中所請(qǐng)求保護(hù)的產(chǎn)品或方法應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)定為具有顯而易見性（obviousness）。

遵從（Deference）

根據(jù)美國的民事訴訟聯(lián)邦規(guī)則52(a)(6)，對(duì)于事實(shí)問題(matter of fact)的爭議，上訴法院采用“明顯錯(cuò)誤”(clearly erroneous ) 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行審查。也就是說對(duì)于下級(jí)法院的事實(shí)認(rèn)定給予一定遵從(deference)，除非當(dāng)下級(jí)法院事實(shí)認(rèn)定出現(xiàn)“明顯錯(cuò)誤”時(shí)，上訴才予以推翻重審。

外部證據(jù)（extrinsic evidence）

委員會(huì)有時(shí)需要借助外部證據(jù)支持以對(duì)權(quán)利要求范圍進(jìn)行判斷，這些外部證據(jù)屬于事實(shí)問題，通常包括：字典解釋、專家證詞、訴訟材料、技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等。

本案Vivint的專利涉及對(duì)家用設(shè)備遠(yuǎn)程監(jiān)控的系統(tǒng)和方法，例如HVAC系統(tǒng)?！巴ㄓ嵲O(shè)備識(shí)別碼（communication device identification codes）”被分配到用戶的遠(yuǎn)程設(shè)備，當(dāng)設(shè)備發(fā)生故障時(shí)，系統(tǒng)通過“信息資料”通知特定的用戶。委員會(huì)對(duì)“通訊設(shè)備識(shí)別碼”的解釋為：能夠獨(dú)特識(shí)別通訊設(shè)備的某物。委員會(huì)認(rèn)為其中包括設(shè)備ID或設(shè)備序列號(hào)（Vivint專利圖形中的一個(gè)變量），但不包括電話號(hào)碼和郵箱地址。

聯(lián)邦巡回法院撤銷了PTAB的權(quán)利要求解釋，指出Vivint的專利沒有定義“通訊設(shè)備識(shí)別碼”，而排除電話號(hào)碼和郵箱地址作為識(shí)別碼，“違反了專利教導(dǎo)（patents’ teachings）”，其中明確教導(dǎo)電話號(hào)碼可獨(dú)特地識(shí)別通訊設(shè)備?！狈ㄔ航忉尩溃?br/>

即便假設(shè)委員會(huì)對(duì)權(quán)利要求的解釋是正確的，然而，委員會(huì)的結(jié)論認(rèn)為電話號(hào)碼或郵箱地址不能獨(dú)特地識(shí)別通訊設(shè)備違反了專利教導(dǎo)。例如，涉案專利解釋了移動(dòng)識(shí)別號(hào)碼與設(shè)備相連就如同電話號(hào)碼與移動(dòng)電話相連的方式一樣，如通訊設(shè)備 … … 但委員會(huì)的解釋卻恰恰相反… … 涉案專利在特定圖形中包含“設(shè)備ID”和“序列號(hào)”的變量，例如，專利提出這些變量還可用于識(shí)別通訊設(shè)備。專利沒有提出電話號(hào)碼和郵箱地址不可進(jìn)行此類操作。

法院同時(shí)駁回了Vivint以下主張：由于委員會(huì)依賴Vivint的專家證詞作為外部證據(jù)（extrinsic evidence），委員會(huì)的裁決解釋有權(quán)得到法院遵從。法院認(rèn)為委員會(huì)對(duì)權(quán)利要求的解釋“沒有參考任何外部證據(jù)，”認(rèn)為即便“委員會(huì)對(duì)Vivint的專家予以信任”，但參考“僅應(yīng)用于對(duì)現(xiàn)有技術(shù)的解釋（既專利的有效性而非權(quán)利要求解釋）。”作為進(jìn)一步的支持，法院指出在委員會(huì)的聲明中，其對(duì)權(quán)利要求的解釋“是基于對(duì)涉案專利權(quán)利要求和說明書的復(fù)審?！?br/>

啟示

本案向從業(yè)人員澄清了：專家證詞應(yīng)用于已被解釋的權(quán)利要求（a construed term），在上訴中可能不構(gòu)成有權(quán)使法院予以遵從的事實(shí)認(rèn)定，這與引用專家證詞作為支持正確的權(quán)利要求解釋本身恰恰相反。這樣的區(qū)別可能會(huì)特別影響到法院為認(rèn)定事實(shí)所采用的“實(shí)質(zhì)性證據(jù)”審查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)（“substantial evidence”standard of review）”，既“一個(gè)具有正常理性的人，可以接受這樣的相關(guān)證據(jù)足以支持所得結(jié)論?！?br/>

Vivint案的裁決與近期一系聯(lián)邦巡回法院裁決相符合，這些案件強(qiáng)調(diào)PTAB有義務(wù)“對(duì)其裁決提供充分細(xì)致的解釋，以確保有意義的司法審查及防止對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)行為的司法干預(yù)”。Rovalma, S.A. v. B?hler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG. 例如Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc.案，法院認(rèn)為委員會(huì)采納請(qǐng)?jiān)溉说囊庖姇?，不?gòu)成將請(qǐng)?jiān)溉舜砺蓭煹霓q論轉(zhuǎn)化為事實(shí)認(rèn)定，或滿足對(duì)相關(guān)認(rèn)定所要求的解釋；在re Van Os案，委員會(huì)認(rèn)為缺乏提供所要求的理由而對(duì)現(xiàn)有技術(shù)進(jìn)行組合是很直觀的，因?yàn)椤叭狈σ恍┗驹淼年U述，既認(rèn)為現(xiàn)有技術(shù)的組合為‘常識(shí)’或‘直觀的’，與簡單說明組合是顯而易見的并無區(qū)別”；在Emerson Elec. Co. v. SIPCO, LLC案，“由于委員會(huì)對(duì)其分析中至關(guān)重要一點(diǎn)的推理沒有充分解釋，并且該結(jié)論違反了委員會(huì)對(duì)幾乎相同事實(shí)另一案件的裁決，我們撤銷委員會(huì)對(duì)所上訴權(quán)利要求的裁決并對(duì)訴訟還押候?qū)?。”從業(yè)人員在準(zhǔn)備上訴策略時(shí)應(yīng)記住法院著重PTAB對(duì)其裁決充分解釋的義務(wù)。

附：英文全文

Adequacy of Explanation Remains Key Area of PTAB Reversal

In Vivint, Inc. v. Alarm.com, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed a claim construction by the PTAB which “suggest[ed] the opposite” of the teachings of the patents at issue, and gave guidance to practitioners on when the Board’s reliance on expert testimony entitles the Board’s construction to deference. The Court’s non-precedential opinion is consistent with a string of recent decisions stressing the PTAB’s obligation to adequately explain its decisions.

Vivint’s patents are directed to systems and methods for remotely monitoring home equipment, such as an HVAC system. “Communication device identification codes” are assigned to the user’s remote devices, and the system notifies a particular user in case of the equipment’s malfunction through “message profiles” (e.g., settings to notify different users if a malfunction occurs during the day versus at night). The Board construed “communication device identification codes” as “something ‘capable of uniquely identifying communication devices,’” which the Board found included either a device ID or a serial number of a device (variables from one of Vivint’s patent’s figures), but excluded phone numbers and email addresses.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s construction, pointing out that Vivint’s patents did not define “communication device identification codes,” and that the exclusion of phone numbers or email addresses as identification codes “defie[d] the patents’ teachings” which “expressly [taught] that a phone number can uniquely identify a . . . communication device.” The Court explained:

Even assuming [the Board’s construction] is correct, however, the Board’s conclusion that a phone number or email address cannot uniquely identify a communication device defies the patents’ teachings. For example, both patents explain that a mobile identification number refers to a device in the same way that a phone number refers to a cellular phone, i.e. a communication device. . . . But the Board’s construction suggests the opposite. . . . That the ’123 patent includes “Device ID” and “Serial Number” variables in a particular figure, for example, suggests these variables might also be used to identify communication devices. It does not suggest that phone numbers and email addresses cannot also do so.

The Court also rejected Vivint’s assertion that the Board’s construction was “entitled to deference because it relied on extrinsic evidence,” Vivint’s expert testimony. The Court found that the Board’s construction was “without reference to any extrinsic evidence,” finding that although “[t]he Board did credit Vivint’s expert,” it did so “only in applying its construction . . . to the prior art.” As further support, the Court pointed to the Board’s statement that its construction was “[b]ased on [its] review of the claims and Specification of the ’601 patent.”

Takeaways:

Vivint clarifies for practitioners that expert testimony applying a construed term may not constitute a factual finding entitled to deference on appeal, as opposed to expert testimony that is cited in support of the proper construction itself. This distinction may be especially impactful in view of the Court’s “substantial evidence” standard of review for findings of fact, which is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Vivint is also in line with a string of recent Federal Circuit decisions stressing the PTAB’s obligation to “set forth a sufficiently detailed explanation of its determinations both to enable meaningful judicial review and to prevent judicial intrusion on agency authority.” Rovalma, S.A. v. B?hler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG, 856 F.3d 1019, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042-48 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding Board’s adoption of petitioner’s brief did not “transform [the petitioner’s] attorney argument into factual findings or supply the requisite explanation that must accompany such findings”); In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Board’s finding that it would have been intuitive to combine prior art lacked the requisite reasoning because “[a]bsent some articulated rationale, a finding that a combination of prior art would have been ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ is no different than merely stating the combination ‘would have been obvious.’”); Emerson Elec. Co. v. SIPCO, LLC, No. 2017-1866, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2018) (non-precedential) (“Because the Board did not adequately explain its reasoning on a point that was central to its analysis and its conclusion on that point was contrary to another Board opinion on nearly identical facts, we vacate the Board’s determination as to the appealed claims and remand for further proceedings.”). Practitioners preparing an appeal strategy would do well to keep in mind the Court’s focus on the PTAB’s obligation to fully explain its determinations.

Citation: Vivint, Inc. v. Alarm.com, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 35817 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).

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作者：Jafon Fearson律師及James Naughton律師
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專利審查與上訴委員會(huì)對(duì)裁決的充分解釋仍是判斷撤銷的關(guān)鍵

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